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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : Appellate Court No. 20060676 
ANTHONY GALLEGOS, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the 
Defendant to the charge of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-103. The plea of 
guilty was taken before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon on the 30th day of 
March 2006. Jurisdiction for the Appeal should be conferred upon the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA? 
1 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for 
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 10, 25) and 
hearings and a ruling on that motion. (R. 30, 41) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly erroneous 
standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that 
decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). "However, the 
ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional 
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). 
(See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
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§58-37-8(2)(c). Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) 
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
§76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) Intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
§77-15-1. Incompetent person not to be tried for public offense. 
No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
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(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, 
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
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Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed March 3, 
2006, with the offenses of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
class A misdemeanor; Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; Threat/Use of 
Dangerous Weapon in Fight, a Class A misdemeanor; and Possession of a 
Controlled Substance within Correctional Facility, a class A misdemeanor 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With Priors), a third-
degree felony. On March 3, 2006, the Defendant made an initial appearance 
before the Honorable Judge Pamela G. Heffernan and the matter was continued 
to March 6, 2006. On March 6, 2006, Defendant appeared before The 
Honorable Ernie W. Jones and the information was read (R. 10). 
A plea negotiation was entered into between the State and the Defendant. 
The Defendant, represented by an attorney, pled guilty to Attempted Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, and Aggravated Assault, a 
third degree felony, and the remaining charges were dismissed. (R. 29) On 
May 24, 2006, after entering the plea, and before sentencing, the Defendant filed 
a motion to withdraw his plea. (R. 37) Defendant's reasoning for this motion to 
withdraw his plea was that "The defendant feels that he is not guilty." The 
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Defendant claimed at the hearing that he was under the influence at the time of 
his entry of plea, and therefore his plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made. 
The motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea was heard on June 8, 2006, and 
the motion was denied. (R.44) The Defendant was sentenced on June 8, 2006, 
to a term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years on the third degree 
felony and a term of 365 days on the class A misdemeanor. (R. 44) The 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 11, 2003.(R. 32) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 3, 2006, the Defendant was charged by information with a 
second-degree felony possession of a controlled substance in a jail or prison; a 
third-degree felony aggravated assault; a class A misdemeanor threatening with 
a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel; and a class A misdemeanor possession 
of a controlled substance in jail or prison. According to the factual basis 
delivered to the court at the plea hearing on March 30, 2006, on March 2, 2006, 
police officers were called to a bar to investigate a reported stabbing. When the 
officers arrived the Defendant was outside of the bar; and the victim and several 
other witnesses identified the Defendant as the person that stabbed the victim 
with a knife. The Defendant was taken into custody and transported to the jail. 
At the jail the police discovered methamphetamine on the Defendant. (R. 56/5) 
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According to the probable cause statement the police also found a small bag of 
marijuana on the Defendant at the jail at the same time. (R. 3) 
On March 30, 2006, the Defendant entered into a plea negotiation wherein 
the Defendant pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor attempted possession of a 
controlled substance and to the third-degree felony aggravated assault. The 
other two counts were dismissed. (R. 56/2 ) At the time of the entry of plea, the 
Defendant acknowledged that he had read and signed the statement in support of 
guilty plea (R22) and that he understood the contents. (R. 56/4) At that same 
hearing the Defendant acknowledged that he was currently on a medication 
called Thorazine; however, he informed the court that it did not cloud his 
judgment. (R. 56/5 ) 
On May 30, 2006, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw plea of 
guilty stating as grounds, "the defendant feels that he is not guilty." (R. 37) At a 
subsequent hearing on June 1, 2006, the court was informed by the defense that 
the Defendant was under the influence of Thorazine at the time that he entered 
his plea. (R.. 58/5) On June 8, 2006, the court revisited the motion wherein the 
Defendant reiterated that he believed that he was under the influence of 
Thorazine and that "[he] would agree probably to anything at that time. But 
since I've stopped those, I've got a clear head, I can think straight, and do the 
right thing." (R. 59/2) The trial court, after indicating that it had reviewed the 
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tape of the proceedings, ruled, "I am persuaded and so find right now that your 
plea was knowing and voluntary. You are not under the influence of drugs or 
medication or anything else... You understood very well,... your motion to... 
withdraw your plea is denied." (R. 59/4) the Defendant was then sentenced to a 
term not to exceed five years of the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Defendant knew, understood, and 
could comprehend his rights when he entered his guilty plea. At the time that the 
Defendant entered his plea, he was on a drug known as Thorazine. Although the 
trial court went through a complete Rule 11 colloquy, that recitation of right was 
given to an individual who, due to the effects of the prescription drug Thorazine, 
was unable to know and understand those rights. Although the fact that the 
Defendant had been using Thorazine, the trial court made no more than a 
cursory inquiry into the Defendant's ability to understand the proceedings. At 
the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, the court made a brief 
conclusionary statement claiming that the Defendant was not under the influence 
of any medication, and therefore the motion to withdraw the plea was denied. 
The court failed to inquire as to the effect of Thorazine according to medical 
literature and immediately discounted the Defendant's claimed that he was 
incapable of making a clear and rational decision based upon the use of that 
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medication. The court's subsequent denial of the Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea was therefore an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA 
On March 30, 2006, the Defendant entered into a plea negotiation wherein 
the Defendant pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor attempted possession of a 
controlled substance and to the third-degree felony aggravated assault. The 
other two counts were dismissed. (R. 56/2) The Defendant timely filed a 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, and the court held a hearing on that 
motion. At the hearing, the trial court heard arguments, heard from the 
Defendant, and apparently viewed the videotape of the plea proceeding. After 
that hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
The Court, in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993), held that 
the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has further noted 
that it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact 
made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 
(Utah 1999) "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly 
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complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty 
plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 
983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 
(Utah 1996)) 
In the more recent decision of State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, 140 P.3d 
1288, the Court was presented with a very similar case, albeit the drug under 
which the defendant was allegedly under the influence was alcohol. In that case, 
where the court had made specific findings that it had reviewed the tape 
recorded proceedings of the plea entry, and made specific findings that the 
defendant was not under the influence of alcohol at the time; the Court upheld 
the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The case at bar is 
somewhat different than the Beckstead decision. In the present case the court 
simply made a conclusionary statement that the defendant was not under the 
influence of any drugs or medication. The only evidence the court had in that 
regard was that the Defendant was in fact under the influence of Thorazine. The 
trial court failed to make any specific findings as to the effect of Thorazine on 
an individual's ability to understand and comprehend important decisions such 
as the entiy of a plea. The court did not inquire into how the drug affected the 
Defendant. The Defendant at the hearing stated "they got me on Thorazine, and 
I don't— I don't like it. I don't want it." (R. 56/5) Although the trial court asked 
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the Defendant if the drug in anyway clouded his judgment, and the Defendant 
responded in the negative. The court should have been well aware that 
individuals who are under the influence of drugs normally did not acknowledge 
the effects that those drugs may have on their ability to reason and think clearly. 
The case law is clear that a trial court must ensure that the defendant's plea has 
strictly met all the requirements of Rule 11, as well as meeting all constitutional 
requirements, and any failure in the process requires the granting of a 
subsequent motion by the defendant to withdraw his plea. A trial court abuses its 
discretion by failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 
violation is present. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^ f 23, the Court held: 
We hold the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying Mora's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court that accepted 
the plea failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 when it accepted 
Mora's guilty plea without correctly incorporating the affidavit 
into the record or establishing elsewhere on the record that Mora 
knew the State was required to prove him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The issue before the Court is whether the Defendant was under the 
influence of Thorazine at the time he entered his plea. Rule 11 requires that the 
defendant enter that plea voluntarily, and that the defendant "knows and 
understand each of the rights listed in Rule 11(e). Although two months after 
the plea hearing the trial court made the finding that the Defendant was not 
under the influence to the degree that he was impaired, the court did not review 
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the appropriate factors. The trial court apparently made no effort to determine 
the medical effects Thorazine would have on an individual, nor did the trial 
court inquire as to the level of dosage or how recently the medication was taken. 
The proper reviewing factors, pursuant to case law cited above, is 
whether the trial court "strictly complied with Rule 11." This strict compliance 
would include making a determination as to whether or not the Defendant knew 
and understood all of the rights described to him in the plea colloquy. 
In the case of U.S. v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1990), the Court 
allowed a plea of guilty to stand where the defendant stated he had been 
"drinking heavily" when he had spoken to his defense counsel during plea 
negotiations and had forgotten to tell defense counsel of his prior record. (An 
omission corrected later to the probation department.) Although the court 
allowed the plea to stand, in a footnote the court clarified that: "[The defendant] 
does not allege that he was intoxicated at the time of the entry of his plea on 
May 18, 1989." (Id at footnote 3) 
In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his 
plea, based on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness. The Defendant, by the only 
account available to the trial court, had used the prescription medication 
Thorazine on the day that the plea was entered. It is important to note that on 
June 8, 2006, the Court revisited the motion wherein the Defendant reiterated 
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that he believed that he was under the influence of Thorazine, and the Defendant 
claimed that "[he] would agree probably to anything at that time. But since I've 
stopped those, I've got a clear head, I can think straight, and do the right thing." 
(R. 59/2) 
Although these statements were not part of the original plea hearing, the 
Court in the case of State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 675 (Utah App. 1993) held 
that: 
Courts considering alleged violations in the taking of guilty pleas 
are "not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at 
the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the 
information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys 
before entering the plea." (Quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 
852 P.2d988(Utah 1993)) 
The trial court's error in the present case was that it did not inquire further 
into the Defendant's mental condition once the court had been advised that the 
Defendant had consumed Thorazine prior to the plea hearing. The trial court 
made no inquiry into the amount of Thorazine the Defendant had ingested, nor 
did the trial court making independent inquiry as to the effects of Thorazine may 
have an individual. 
Rule 11(e)(3) requires that a pleading defendant "knows of the right to 
the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront 
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and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived;" (emphasis added) 
Rule 11 (e)(4)(A) requires that the defendant "understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;" 
(emphasis added). 
Finally, Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the pleading defendant "knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which 
a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences;" (emphasis added) 
A defendant that is under the influence of certain drugs cannot know, 
understand, or comprehend the significance of any of the above Rule 11 
requirements. The Utah Appellate Courts have required that the trial court insure 
that these procedural requirements of knowledge and understanding are strictly 
complied with. 
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Although there is not a great deal of case law dealing with a defendant 
being under the influence of drugs during the plea hearing, the Utah Appellate 
Courts have dealt extensively with pleas taken while a defendant is mentally ill. 
In the case of Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382 (Utah 2001), the court, in 
denying a ten year post conviction habeas corpus petition, noted that, "4A 
mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings 
against such a defendant do not comport with due process.5 State v. Young, 780 
P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 
(I960))." In the case of York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), this Court held: "Due process requires that a defendant be competent to 
plead guilty, (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 
L.Ed.2d 103 (1975))." 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an individual must be 
competent to enter a guilty plea. In the case of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987) the court placed the burden of ensuring a pleading defendants' 
competency on the trial court, and that inquiry into such should be made at the 
time a plea in entered. In State v. Gibbons the court stated: 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered. (Id. at 1312). 
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This concept is not only mandated by due process requirements, but is 
statutory as well. UCA §77-15-1 provides that, "[n]o person who is incompetent 
to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." 
The State may argue that even with the failure of the trial court to 
contemporaneously make a determination of the defendant's ability to know, 
understand and comprehend the rights he is waiving, the conviction should stand 
on the grounds of harmless error. Although the trial court is not required to 
make a comprehensive determination of a pleading defendant's mental ability in 
every case, when it is brought to the courts attention that the defendant might be 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, further inquiry should be required. The 
Courts have held that an error in a Rule 11 colloquy is not harmless. In the 
recent case of State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, the Court was presented with a 
guilty plea that was taken with a Rule 11 colloquy that was defective in that the 
court failed to inform the defendant "the State must prove him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt"1. (Id. at *|22) Given that failure only, the Court reversed his 
conviction on the grounds that the Court presumed harm because, "by not 
knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully 
informed decision." State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101, 104 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). "If 
1
 In State v. Mora, (Infra) the Court found the Rule 11 colloquy defective even 
where there was an affidavit in advance of plea signed by the defendant but not 
properly incoiporated into the record. 
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the defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the 
guilty plea cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and 
still claim to have done justice." {State v. Mora at f22) The Court in State v. 
Mora went on to hold: 
Under Rule 11(e), the trial court "may not accept the plea" until it 
has found that "the defendant understands . . . that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of [the 
crime's] elements beyond a reasonable doubt." Utah R.Crim.P. 
11(e)(4)(A). Thus, since the trial court failed to determine 
whether Mora understood that the State carried the burden of 
proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court 
failed to strictly comply with Rule 11. {State v. Mora at ^21 
emphasis added). 
The defendant is cognizant of the recent decision of State v. Becks tead, 
2006 UT 42, If 15, 140 P.3d 1288 where the Court declared, 
We decline to judicially amend Rule 11 to mandate additional 
minimum inquiries that a sentencing court must pursue when 
alerted that a defendant may be unable to enter a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea. Such additions would increase the range of 
matters with which a sentencing judge would be required to 
strictly comply. This would be unwise. 
However, the present case is significantly different than the facts in the above 
referenced case. In the present case the court did not make the significant 
factual findings there were made in the Becks tead case. In the present case the 
court simply stated: 
You are not under the influence of drugs or medication or 
anything else. You understood very well, and in fact when we 
17 
started, I think you were with Mr. Bushell, this court adjourned 
that proceeding. He went back out and had a further visit with 
him and came back, and the court finished that colloquy with 
you. And I went through each of the required questions that I'm 
required to by law. And you gave me a satisfactory answer. And 
one of the questions that I asked you after taking a factual basis is 
did you — something to the effect, did you do that or is that 
substantially correct, and you admitted those facts. So there isn't 
going to be any right to have a trial. Your motion to deny — to 
withdraw your plea is denied. (R. 59/4) 
It is significant to note that the court made no factual findings as to the 
Defendant's speech patterns, demeanor, or any other physical observation about 
the defendant. The court further did not inquire into the potential effects that 
Thorazine may have on a defendant. (Unlike the effects that alcohol would have 
on an individual, which could be judicially noticed) 
The Utah and Federal Appellate Court's have required reversal of a 
court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when there has been 
what some may consider a minor Rule 11 violation. The Court's have reversed 
such denials for the omission of the word "speedy" and "impartial" {State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P3d 276), omission of the word "speedy" {State v. 
Cornell, 2005 UT 28, 114 P.3d 569) and omission of the words "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" {State v. Mora) in the colloquy. Reason and logic would 
suggest that this Court reverse the case at bar on the grounds that there was 
18 
never an inquiry into the Defendant's level of drug impairment at the time the 
plea wras entered. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the failure of the trial court to properly determine that the 
Defendant knew, understood and could comprehend his rights pursuant to the 
Rule 11 requirements, and based upon the fact that the plea was entered when 
the Defendant had taken Thorazine, the Defendant respectfully requests this 
court reverse the trial courts denial of the Defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea, and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of October 2007 
LNDALL W. klCHARDS x 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtliff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, S a l t J ^ e City, Utah_84114-0180, postage prepaid 
this 2l day of October 2007. 
^NDALLW;i^IC 
Attorney at Law 
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Tape Number: L06 0 8 06 Tape Count: 4:08 
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2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
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HEARING 
on 
on 
(amended) 
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody and represented by Steve Laker. Defendant's motion to 
withdraw the plea is addressed. 
Defense counsel presents arguments. 
The defendant addresses the Court and argues that he was under the 
influence of medication at the time the plea was entered. 
The State responds and presents arguments. The State argues that 
no sufficient grounds to withdraw the plea have been presented and 
further, that the defendant had no indication of being under the 
influence. 
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The Court finds that the colloquy was reviewed very carefully at 
the time the plea was entered. 
The Court further finds that the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily entered his plea. 
The defendant stated that he was not under the influence that he 
understood his rights. 
The Court finds that the defendant gave satisfactory answers and 
admitted the fact. 
The Court denies the motion and will proceed with sentencing. 
Defense counsel requests that the sentences run concurrently with 
each other. 
The defendant addresses the Court and requests that trial be set. 
The Court finds that the defendant waived his right to having a 
trial and admitted his guilt. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These sentences shall run concurrently with each other. The 
sentence on the class A misdemeanor may be served at the Utah State 
Prison. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
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Restitution shall remain open for 60 days 
Dated this /\cAday of HlUjis?_ 20/ 
Ah 
MICHAEL AD/LYON 
Distriqt/Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
21 
SECO.'.'D D'CTr -T 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 3CL7T 
3 
4 
51 
6l 
7 
8 
9| 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
II 
19 I 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
STATE OF UTAH 
©s- - -
» JUL 27 PM \,lk 
JUL k 7 2UG6 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
ANTHONY LEO GALLEGOS, 
DEFENDANT. 
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 061901112 
SENTENCING HEARING 
JUNE 8, 2006 
HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON 
~k ~k ~k °k -k 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
BRENDA J. BEATON 
STEPHEN A. LAKER 
-k + * * * 
REPORTED/TRANSCRIBED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR BLED 
2 525 GRANT AVENUE U f A H APELLATE COURT$ 
OGDEN, UTAH 84 4 01 IIII p '; '«m 
(801) 395-1056 « ^ » 
VUtt(MV>S flRIRiNAL 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
OGDEN, UTAH JUNE 8, 2006 
MR. LAKER: NUMBER 11, YOUR HONOP, ANTHONY GALLEGOS. 
THE BAILIFF: GALLEGOS. 
MR. LAKER: I THINK THIS IS THE ONE THAT YOU WERE TAKING 
A LOOK AT THE TAPE. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THAT'S WHAT WE'RE TO 
SEE WHAT YOU'LL DO WITH REGARD TO HIS — 
THE COURT: OKAY. FIRST OF ALL, STATE OF UTAH VERSUS 
ANTHONY GALLEGOS. THERE IS A PENDING MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE 
GUILTY PLEA. I'LL HEAR FIRST OF ALL FROM YOU, MR. LAKER, AND 
THEN FROM YOU, MS. BEATON, AS WELL. 
MR. LAKER: LAST WEEK I STATED EVERYTHING THAT I, YOU 
KNOW, HE JUST — HE HAS INDICATED TO ME THAT HE FEELS THAT HE 
IS NOT GUILTY OF THAT AND WOULD LIKE TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE 
RIGHT TO A TRIAL. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE YOU 
WANT TO SAY? 
MR. GALLEGOS: YES, SIR. I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHEN YOU 
FIRST ASKED ME IF — IF I WAS PRESSURED OR ANYTHING LIKE 
THAT. I DIDN'T REALLY QUITE UNDERSTAND IT BECAUSE UNDER THE 
DRUGS THAT I WAS ON, I WOULD AGREE PROBABLY TO ANYTHING AT 
THAT 
HEAD, 
SAY? 
TIME. BUT SINCE I'VE STOPPED THOSE, I'VE GOT A CLEAR 
I CAN THINK STRAIGHT, AND DO THE RIGHT THING. 
THE COURT: MS. BEATON, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING YOU WANT TO 
MS. BEATON: YOUR HONOR, AS I ' D INDICATED THE LAST TIME, 
1 I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE BASIS THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS 
2 INDICATED FOR THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA IS A 
3 VALID REASON. THERE'S CASE LAW ON THIS THAT INDICATES THAT 
4 IT'S NOT A VALID REASON. AND IT DOESN'T GO TO THE MANNER IN 
5 WHICH THE PLEA WAS ENTERED. IT NOW APPARENTLY GOES TO SOME 
6 KIND OF BUYER'S REMORSE BY THE DEFENDANT, WHICH IS NOT 
7 SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO WITHDRAW A PLEA GUILTY. THE 
8 DEFENDANT'S COMMENT ABOUT BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF SOME 
9 KIND OF NARCOTIC WHEN HE WAS — HE TOOK THE PLEA, HE ACTUALLY 
10 WAS BOOKED IN ON VIDEOS ON MARCH 3RD. I SHOW HE WOULD HAVE 
11 BEEN IN CUSTODY UNTIL THE 27TH. AND I THINK THE PRESUMPTION 
12 OUGHT TO BE THAT HE'S NOT GETTING DRUGS WHILE HE'S IN THE 
13 WEBER COUNTY JAIL. AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHEN HE WAS 
14 ASKED ON VIDEO BECAUSE I KNOW THIS COURT ASKS JUST ROUTINELY 
15 WHETHER OR NOT SOMEBODY'S UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY KIND OF 
16 DRUG OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION 
17 AFFIRMATIVELY IN THAT REGARD. AND I DO NOT RECALL THAT THERE 
18 WAS ANY FLAW THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PLEA WAS TAKEN. AND SO 
19 THE STATE WOULD ASK THAT YOU DENY THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
2 0 WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA. 
21 THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. GALLEGOS, THIS COURT DENIES 
22 YOUR MOTION. FIRST OF ALL — 
23 MR. GALLEGOS: YOUR HONOR, ALL I WANNA DO IS JUST — 
24 THE COURT: JUST — 
25 MR. GALLEGOS: — CHANCE TO PROVE THAT I'M RIGHT. 
4 
1 THE COURT: -- JUST — WELL, YOU WERE GIVEN AN 
2 OPPORTUNITY AND YOU CHOSE TO WAIVE THAT RIGHT AND ENTER A 
31 PLEA OF GUILTY. 
MR. GALLEGOS: NO, I WAS TALKED INTO IT. 
5I THE COURT: NOW, YOU JUST BE PATIENT AND LISTEN TO ME; I 
6 LISTENED TO YOU. I WENT THROUGH A VERY CAREFUL COLLOQUY WITH 
7 I YOU, AND I AM PERSUADED AND SO FIND RIGHT NOW THAT YOUR PLEA 
WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY. YOU WERE NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
91 OF DRUGS OR MEDICATION OR ANYTHING ELSE. YOU UNDERSTOOD VERY 
10 WELL, AND IN FACT WHEN WE STARTED, I THINK YOU WERE WITH 
11 MR. BUSHELL, THIS COURT ADJOURNED THAT PROCEEDING. YOU WENT 
12 BACK OUT AND HAD A FURTHER VISIT WITH HIM AND CAME BACK, AND 
13 THE COURT FINISHED THAT COLLOQUY WITH YOU. AND I WENT 
14 THROUGH EACH OF THE REQUIRED QUESTIONS THAT I'M REQUIRED TO 
15 BY LAW. AND YOU GAVE ME A SATISFACTORY ANSWER. AND ONE OF 
16 THE QUESTIONS THAT I ASKED YOU AFTER TAKING A FACTUAL BASIS 
17 IS DID YOU — SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT, DID YOU DO THAT OR IS 
18 THAT SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT, AND YOU ADMITTED THOSE FACTS. SO 
19 THERE ISN'T GOING TO BE ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A TRIAL. YOUR 
20 MOTION TO DENY — TO WITHDRAW YOUR PLEA IS DENIED. 
21 TODAY THE COURT IMPOSES SENTENCE. I'LL GIVE YOU A 
22 CHANCE TO SAY SOMETHING BEFORE I DO THAT. 
23 MR. LAKER: YOUR HONOR, THIS RECOMMENDATION IS A 
24 RECOMMENDATION FOR ZERO TO FIVE YEARS. AND — AND ALSO ONE 
25 YEAR IN THE COUNTY JAIL ON THE MISDEMEANOR. WE'D ASK THAT 
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THOSE RUN CONCURRENT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING 
YOU WANT TO SAY, MR. GALLEGOS? 
MR. GALLEGOS: YES. I'M NOT GUILTY OF THE CHARGE. I 
HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO CROSS-EXAMINE MY WITNESSES TO PROVE 
THAT. 
THE COURT: YOU — 
MR. GALLEGOS: BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
THE COURT: YOU HAD THAT CHANCE AND YOU WAIVED THAT 
RIGHT AND YOU ADMITTED YOUR GUILT. THERE'S NOTHING TO — 
11 FURTHER TO TALK ABOUT. I FIND YOUR PLEA WAS KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT THAT 
YOU BE COMMITTED TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON FOR A PERIOD NOT TO 
EXCEED FIVE YEARS ON THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY CONVICTION. 
THAT YOU SERVE ONE YEAR IN THE WEBER COUNTY JAIL. I'LL ALLOW 
THOSE SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH ONE ANOTHER. 
YOU HAVE A CRIMINAL HISTORY IN CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, AND 
UTAH. AND TODAY, YOU'RE GOING TO BE PUNISHED FOR IT. 
THANK YOU. 
MS. BEATON: IS THERE ANY RESTITUTION? 
THE COURT: I'M NOT SURE THERE WAS. 
MR. GALLEGOS: IS IT POSSIBLE TO GET A FURLOUGH TO SEE 
MY DAD? 
THE COURT: NO. 
MR. LAKER: ACTUALLY, YOUR HONOR, I WAS GOING TO ASK 
b 
THAT, THAT HE HAS — HIS FATHER DIED AND HE'S ~ JUST VERY 
RECENTLY, AND WE WOULD ASK THAT THE COURT CONSIDER ALLOWING 
HIM A FURLOUGH TO GO TO THE FUNERAL. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE SOME PROOF OF THAT? 
MR. LAKER: HE JUST TOLD ME ABOUT IT TODAY. I'M SURE WE 
CAN SUPPLY COURT WITH AN OBITUARY. 
MS. BEATON: THE STATE OPPOSES A FURLOUGH WHEN 
SOMEBODY'S BEEN COMMITTED TO THE — 
THE COURT: YEAH, I'M NOT GOING TO --
MS. BEATON: — UTAH STATE PRISON. 
THE COURT: — GOING TO DO THAT. YOU HAVE BEEN 
COMMITTED TO PRISON. I'M NOT EVEN GOING TO CONSIDER THAT. 
HOWEVER, I WILL GIVE YOU CREDIT FOR THE — 
MR. GALLEGOS: YOUR HONOR (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: --7 0 DAYS THAT YOU'VE SERVED. 
MR. GALLEGOS: LAST TIME THEY TOOK ME IN FOR 30 DAYS AND 
KEPT ME (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. BEATON: 
MR. LAKER: 
THE COURT: 
RESTITUTION? 
MS. BEATON: 
THE COURT: 
REPORT. 
MS. BEATON: 
WAS RESTITUTION DETERMINED? 
I DIDN'T SEE --
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) ANY EVIDENCE OF 
I DON'T KNOW THAT --
I COULDN'T SEE ANY IN THE PRESENTENCE 
I DON'T HAVE A PRESENTENCE REPORT IN MY 
1 FILE FOR SOME REASON. 
2 MR. LAKER: I'M JUST LOOKING REALLY QUICKLY, AND I DON'T 
3 SEE --
4 THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW WHY (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
5 MS. BEATON: THE VICTIM WAS STABBED. 
6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL ENTER AN ORDER OF 
7 RESTITUTION. GIVE YOU 60 DAYS TO DETERMINE WHAT THOSE COSTS 
MAY BE. 
91 MS. BEATON: THANK YOU. 
10 I THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
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2 I CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
4I COUNTY OF WEBER) 
5 THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING SEVEN PAGES OF 
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